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Chapter 10 
Anglo-French Cooperation vis-à-vis the 
African Union
Tony Chafer
In launching the Saint-Malo process at the December 1998 Franco-British 
summit, the UK and French governments declared their intention to set aside a 
century of rivalry and ‘pursue joint cooperation’ on the ground in Africa (Saint-
Malo Declaration 1998). In so doing, they signalled their readiness to move away 
from their traditional spheres of influence in their former African empires and 
towards a continent-wide focus on Africa, including as a central tenet building 
up the capacity of regional and sub-regional organisations. London and Paris 
were helped in this latter goal by the winding up of the Organisation of African 
Unity (OAU) in 1999 and its replacement by the African Union (AU) in July 
2002. This chapter therefore examines British and French policy towards the AU. 
It begins by noting the UK and French neglect of the OAU, and then reviews 
the key developments and contextual changes that pushed for and facilitated a 
more coordinated stance on the AU. It then seeks to explain the recent evolution 
towards a more cooperative approach by examining the key drivers behind 
this enhanced collaboration and it ends by evaluating the extent and nature of 
Anglo-French cooperation vis-à-vis the AU. Within a neoclassical framework, it 
shows how concerns in both the UK and France over their relative power on the 
international stage have pushed both countries to work more closely together with 
African regional and sub-regional organisations. However, divergent interests and 
foreign policy priorities, institutional and resource constraints, and the views of 
the wider domestic polity on state preference have impinged on policy-making 
and ultimately limited the extent of cooperation.
Before proceeding, it is important to emphasise that this is not a chapter about 
the AU per se. A number of recent works have examined the history and structure 
of the organisation and its emerging peace and security architecture (Akokpari 
et al. 2008; Besada 2010; Engel and Porto 2010; Makinda and Okumu 2008). 
Second, and related to this, AU perceptions of Anglo-French cooperation are not 
a central feature of this article, although they cannot of course be entirely ignored. 
In this context it is worth noting that such cooperation has hitherto been broadly 
welcomed by the AU but, as I argue later, this should not be taken for granted. 
Finally, the chapter focuses largely on security cooperation, as this represents 
90 per cent of the European Union’s (EU) engagement with the AU (personal 
communication, EU official, Addis Ababa, 2009) and, in the French case, almost 
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From Rivalry to Partnership?160
its exclusive area of engagement. ‘Peace and security’ is one of the priority areas 
of the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership, although the AU’s strategic plan 2009–
12 has three other thematic priorities (Le Monde Diplomatique 2009), and the 
Africa-EU Strategic Partnership has seven other priority action areas.1 The lack 
of cooperation in these areas will be touched upon where relevant, as it is a useful 
indicator of the nature and limits of Anglo-French collaboration with the AU.
From the OAU to the AU: A New Context for Cooperation
Anglo-French relations in Africa have then been characterised by rivalry since 
the beginning of the colonial period. Following the end of the Cold War there was 
a shift to a more multilateral approach (see Chapter 11) but this did not extend 
to working with the OAU, which continued to be perceived as a dictators’ club 
(Makinda and Okumu 2008: 30). However, French and British neglect of the OAU 
was soon replaced by a more supportive, and in some cases more coordinated, 
approach following the emergence of the AU in 2002. The latter set out to be a 
quite different type of organisation from the OAU; more outward-looking than its 
predecessor, its ambition being to create an integrated, prosperous and peaceful 
Africa, able to play its rightful role on the international stage (AU 2000, art. 3). 
The launch of the AU was also a significant moment because it signalled the 
abandonment of one of the OAU’s founding principles, the commitment to non-
intervention in the internal affairs of member states (Africa News, 11 February 
2002; Mwanasali 2008: 42–5). This reflected the desire of African leaders to take 
greater responsibility for peace and security on the continent.2 More generally, it 
was born of a desire by African leaders to address the marginalisation of Africa in 
the context of accelerating globalisation, and put the continent ‘on track towards 
sustainable growth and development’ (Mathews 2008: 25). The creation of the AU 
thus marked the emergence of a new and credible African multilateral organisation 
that appeared to share the ambition of donor countries to address the challenges of 
governance and security on the continent. (Porteous 2008: 54–6).
At the same time, the UN did not have the resources to respond to the growing 
number and increased complexity of peacekeeping and security operations on the 
continent. Moreover, the US was reluctant to undertake military interventions in 
Africa following its humiliation in Somalia, while the EU for its part was making 
1 The others are: Democratic Governance and Human Rights; Trade, Regional 
Integration and Infrastructure; Millennium Development Goals; Energy; Climate Change; 
Migration, Mobility and Employment; Science, Information Society and Space.
2 Article 4 of the AU’s Constitutive Act asserted ‘the right of the Union to intervene 
in a member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances’, 
including war crimes and crimes against humanity. The ‘responsibility to protect’ is the idea 
of transnational responsibility for human welfare, see http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.
org (accessed 17 June 2010). 
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limited progress on its rapid reaction force prior to Saint-Malo. Both the UK and 
France thus had a shared interest in supporting Africans to peacekeep themselves 
by promoting the notion of ‘African solutions to African problems’. Against this 
background, the launch of the RECAMP (Renforcement des Capacités Africaines 
de Maintien de la Paix) programme represented a watershed in French policy, 
marking a move away from its traditional approach of direct, unilateral, military 
intervention towards a policy of supporting Africans to peacekeep themselves. The 
parallel launch of the UK’s African Peacekeeping Training Support Programme in 
1997 had the same objective.
The final catalyst for improved Anglo-French cooperation vis-à-vis the AU 
was the shift in the way that the EU engaged with the continent. EU African 
policy, through the successive Yaoundé and Lomé conventions, was largely 
driven by the European Commission (EC); its partner was the African-Caribbean-
Pacific (ACP) group of countries, and its focus was trade and development. 
The political dimension of the relationship was left to member states and their 
bilateral relations with the ACP states. This began to change in the 1990s with the 
introduction of economic and political conditionalities under Lomé IV, which in 
2000 were integrated into the successor Cotonou accords as one of the pillars of 
the new agreement linking the EU and the ACP. In the same year, at a summit held 
in Cairo, African and European leaders launched a new political dialogue outside 
the Lomé/Cotonou framework. Building on this and following the launch of the 
AU, in 2005 the EU developed an Africa strategy for the first time, for which its 
privileged interlocutor was the AU. At the same time, the EU was developing the 
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), for which Africa rapidly emerged 
as a key theatre, and responsibility for which fell to the European Council. These 
developments were crucially important for three reasons. First, they marked 
a move away from an essentially ‘technical’ relationship between the EU and 
Africa (as part of the ACP group of countries), in which the EC took the policy 
lead, towards a much more overtly political, and indeed military, relationship. 
Second, reflecting the growing importance of the EU as a foreign policy actor, 
the European Council now took an increasingly important role in driving African 
policy. This shift towards intergovernmentalism thrust the UK and France, as the 
two member states with the largest residual responsibilities and interests south of 
the Sahara, to the centre of EU policy-making on Africa. Third, the AU, not the 
ACP group of countries, now emerged as the EU’s key strategic partner in Africa, 
a development that was confirmed by the signature of the Africa-EU Strategic 
Partnership at the AU-EU summit in Lisbon in 2007. These developments were 
crucially important in opening the door to increased Anglo-French cooperation 
within the EU vis-à-vis the AU. They transformed the context for UK and French 
policy-making on Africa, pushing them to coordinate policy and also to engage 
with the whole continent, through their partnership with the AU, in a way that 
they had not done in the past.
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The AU and the Saint-Malo Process: Towards Enhanced Cooperation?
With the 1998 Saint-Malo summit promising ‘joint cooperation to promote 
sub-regional integration, in particular between networks of Anglophone and 
Francophone countries’ (Saint-Malo Declaration 19983), the period 1998–2002 
thus marked an important moment in UK and French relations with African 
regional organisations. As we have seen, neither country had sought to engage 
with the OAU in any systematic way. This changed with the foundation of the 
AU. Indeed, the pledge to work jointly with the AU, specifically in the field of 
peace and security, was made explicit in the communiqué issued at the 2004 
Lancaster House summit and renewed at subsequent summits in 2006 and 2008 
(Franco-British Summit 2006; Saint-Malo Ten Years After 2008). However, while 
both countries publicly welcomed its creation, the UK has generally engaged 
more enthusiastically with the AU, reflecting the strategic priority attached by 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) to engaging with international 
organisations, whereas France has focused more of its efforts on working with 
Africa’s sub-regional organisations such as ECOWAS and has adopted a more 
guarded approach to the AU, focusing on the area of security. In the light of this, 
the question to be addressed here is: how far has Anglo-French cooperation vis-à-
vis the AU been taken? In order to do this, we need to understand what has been 
driving French and British approaches to the AU, and examine the obstacles to 
more systematic cooperation.
The first driver towards cooperation was the election in 1997 of new French 
and British governments that wanted to overhaul their two countries’ approaches 
to Africa. Prime Minister Lionel Jospin was a moderniser in terms of African 
policy (see Chapters 4 and 5) and, following the debacle of France’s involvement 
in Rwanda and DRC (then Zaire) in the mid-1990s (Chafer 2005: 17), wanted to 
move away from France’s traditional unilateral approach to Africa, which in the 
military field had earned it the reputation of the ‘gendarme’ of Africa, towards a 
new focus on Africans peacekeeping themselves. His election coincided with the 
election of a New Lab ur government in the UK that sought to re-engage with 
Africa, in particular by promoting an ambitious development agenda through the 
newly created Department for International Development (DfID). After decades 
during which Africa appeared largely marginal to British foreign relations, Tony 
Blair’s government was set to make Africa an explicit policy priority (Porteous 
2008: 1), though not in the military field (the small and time-limited, albeit 
effective, intervention in Sierra Leone in 2001 was the exception in this respect), 
where the UK was keen for Africans to take a much greater role. For both countries 
this new approach implied moving beyond the traditional Anglo-French ‘division 
3 Full summit declaration obtained from the FCO. The ‘Saint-Malo Declaration’ is 
published on several websites but the text is incomplete, even on the FCO website, as it 
omits the part of the declaration referring to Africa, see: www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-
news/?view=PressS&id=10435411, accessed 26 March 2010.
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of labour’ in Africa, whereby France focused its attention on its Francophone ‘pré 
carré’ (sphere of influence), with which it maintained privileged and exclusive 
relations, and the UK concentrated on maintaining good bilateral relations with 
key countries, such as Nigeria in the west and Kenya in the east, that had been 
British colonies (Chafer 2005: 7–23; Cumming 2005: 56–7; Porteous 2008: 7). 
At the same time, both the Jospin and Blair governments were all too aware that 
their countries were suffering from resource constraints that prevented them from 
undertaking all the tasks on the continent that they once had done.
As a result, both governments now perceived it as in their interest to cooperate 
on African issues. This new approach was not driven solely by a concern for 
Africa, however. On the French side, relations between President Chirac, Prime 
Minister Jospin and the German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder were difficult, so 
that Chirac and his foreign affairs minister Hubert Védrine were looking for EU 
policy areas where they could work more closely with the UK. At the same time, 
the UK having opted against joining the euro, Prime Minister Blair nonetheless 
wanted to ‘put the UK at the heart of Europe’, and was looking for policy areas in 
which the UK could play a leading role within the EU.
A further driver of Anglo-French cooperation is that the AU has become an 
important actor in relation to the UNSC in recent years since it, or more precisely 
its Peace and Security Council (PSC), is responsible for establishing the AU’s 
position on matters concerning Africa, including Security Council resolutions, 
that come before the United Nations. This is significant for two reasons. First, 
some two-thirds of the UNSC’s business has in recent years been related to 
Africa and Anglo-French coordination vis-à-vis the PSC is therefore vital if they 
are to influence the AU’s position on issues coming before the UNSC (personal 
communication, French official, Addis Ababa, 2009). Second, and even more 
important, two of the other permanent members of the UNSC, Russia and China, 
are unlikely to support any Security Council resolution on Africa that does not 
have AU support (personal communication, French official, Addis Ababa, 2009). 
The PSC’s position can therefore have a determining influence over the fate of 
resolutions relating to Africa at the UN.
Finally, the growing activism of powerful new external actors in Africa, such 
as China and India, has led to a significant reduction in the importance of the UK 
and France in Africa’s foreign relations since the early 2000s. This has reduced 
their power to do things in Africa, and the resulting decline in leverage provides 
a further incentive for them to cooperate on African issues. The UK and France 
thus have complementary interests pushing them towards closer – and mutually 
beneficial – cooperation vis-à-vis the AU.
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Types of Cooperation with the AU
It is possible to discern four different types, or levels, of cooperation with the AU.4 
First, there is ‘natural’ cooperation, where France and the UK seek to promote 
essentially the same agenda and priorities, and coordination of positions is relatively 
straightforward. Since 2002, the two countries have shared broadly similar 
concerns about Africa, relating to such issues as migration, terrorism, transnational 
crime, conflict, instability and governance. As a result they have rarely been at 
daggers drawn over Africa. Second, there is ‘coincident cooperation’, where the 
two countries want a similar outcome but seek to reach it in different ways, either 
because their motivations are not the same, or because they provide support to 
the AU in distinct ways as the instruments at their disposal are quite different. 
Third, ‘disinterested cooperation’ occurs where cooperation is the product of 
shared liberal norms and values, but working together brings no immediate 
material benefit to the other party.5 The fourth type, ‘deconflictualisation’, is in 
many instances a pre-requisite for the other three. This involves as a minimum the 
two countries pursuing their own initiatives independently, but making efforts to 
ensure that their actions are complementary and do not involve any unnecessary 
duplication of effort. In political terms it means that they are careful not to ‘trip 
each other up’.
To be sure, these forms of cooperation cannot be entirely separated. For 
example, although the two countries share broadly the same agenda in relation 
to Africans taking greater responsibility for security on the continent, they come 
to the problem from quite different perspectives, so that careful negotiation is 
needed in order to achieve the desired outcome. The result may be different forms 
of cooperation situated anywhere on a continuum from actively working together 
with shared agendas on joint projects at one end to simple deconflictualisation at 
the other. Moreover, this typology does not fully take account of the different fora 
and contexts in which cooperation takes place. In particular, a distinction needs 
to be made between bilateral Anglo-French cooperation that involves just the 
French and UK governments working together, and ‘bi-multi’ cooperation that 
involves them working together within multilateral organisations such as the EU 
and the UNSC, in an effort to bring others round to their view. These different 
forms of cooperation often take place in parallel, leading in practice to what can 
perhaps best be described as ‘messy multilateralism’. Nevertheless, while there is 
some overlap between the different types, the analytical distinctions remain useful 
indicators of the nature of cooperation and are useful for drawing a distinction 
4 For a discussion of cooperation problems in international relations, see Martin 
1992: 768–83.
5 The term ‘disinterested cooperation’ does not imply that the two countries have no 
interest in cooperating: from the point of view of diffusing certain norms and values, they 
clearly have such an interest.
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between areas of collaboration and other areas where non-cooperation or limited 
cooperation have been the norm.
‘Natural’ Cooperation
Taking ‘natural’ cooperation first, it should be reiterated that since 2002, France 
and the UK have rarely had major differences over Africa. As Western liberal 
democracies, permanent members of the UNSC, key players in the EU and the 
only major Western powers with significant residual responsibilities and interests 
south of the Sahara, they share a broad set of common values rooted in notions 
of human rights, democratisation, good governance and human security. A good 
example of ‘natural’ cooperation is in relation to support for the AU’s African 
Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).6 Both governments want to avoid the 
costs and risks – in terms of both casualties and potential political damage – 
of direct military involvement, and therefore prefer to pay others to undertake 
peacekeeping operations on the continent. Both also agree that peace and security 
are the prerequisite for development. As the two major EU military powers with the 
capacity to intervene in Africa, their cooperation on the peace and security agenda 
was therefore natural, especially as this was an agenda that they shared with both 
the AU and its emerging APSA. It was therefore to be expected that both countries 
would play a key role within the EU in obtaining the support of EU member 
states for ESDP missions in Africa and for capacity-building, peacekeeping and 
peace support operations under the ESDP, notably in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) and Chad/CAR (see Chapter 5).7 Both have also played lead roles 
in generating EU support for the African Standby Force (ASF), the African Union 
peacekeeping missions in Sudan (AMIS) and Somalia (AMISOM) and, with other 
partners, the development of the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS). 
They have also jointly provided backing for map training exercises and support 
for the MIVAC initiative, an interactive watch and anticipation mechanism that 
6 The AU established the APSA as ‘an operational structure for the effective 
implementation of … conflict prevention, peace-making, peace support operations and 
intervention, as well as peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction’ (Engel and Porto 
2010: 3). The centrepiece of the APSA is the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the role of 
which is to oversee the establishment of the Continental Early-Warning System (CEWS) 
and the African Standby Force (ASF). The PSC is supported by a Panel of the Wise, whose 
role is to advise the PSC on peace and security issues and  help in the peaceful settlement 
of disputes.
7 Although ESDP missions, apart from EU support to AMIS which was provided at 
the request of the AU, do not directly involve the AU, they cannot be entirely ignored here 
as the UK and French governments have played a key role in gaining EU member states’ 
support for these missions, which have in turn been a significant factor shaping EU policy 
towards the AU.
022_Chafer_CH10.indd   165 4/11/2011   10:41:12 AM
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Pr
oo
f C
op
y 
From Rivalry to Partnership?166
has been developed to help the AU build up its early warning capability.8 Crucially 
too, they played a key role, with Portugal, in developing the Africa-EU Strategic 
Partnership, which was signed at the first joint AU-EU summit in Lisbon in 2007, 
and in ensuring that this had a strong security focus (Elowson 2009: 27). 
‘Coincident’ Cooperation
‘Coincident cooperation’ frequently takes place on the ground in Africa, at the 
level of implementation. Thus the principle of Anglo-French support for the APSA 
or cooperation to improve UN peacekeeping mandates is ‘natural’, insofar as both 
countries share the objective of enabling Africans to take more responsibility for 
peace and security on the continent. However, if we look at specific instances 
of cooperation, the two countries often come at an issue from quite different 
perspectives. With regard to the Sudan/Darfur crisis, for example, the UK has 
long been interested in stabilising the Sudan and was one of the three countries 
(with the USA and Norway) that helped to deliver the 2005 Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA). France has never managed to exert any meaningful influence 
over the CPA process and only became involved much later, largely because of 
its concerns about the destabilising impact of the Darfur crisis on two of its key 
allies in the region, Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR) (personal 
communication, Foreign Affairs Ministry official, Paris, 2009). 
This is an example of what I have called ‘messy multilateralism’. There was no 
formal agreement to work together on this issue. Rather, France effectively deferred 
to the UK and accepted that, for historical and other reasons, the UK should take 
the lead on Sudan, while the UK supported France on Chad/CAR. This mutual 
recognition of the comparative advantage of the UK in Sudan and of France in 
Chad/CAR in turn facilitated a more coordinated approach to lobbying the AU. 
This makes sense, as a coordinated approach to lobbying members of the AU’s 
PSC by two of the UNSC’s permanent members is more likely to yield results than 
individual approaches, and because the UK has more influence in Sudan while 
France has more in Chad/CAR. This is therefore a useful means for both countries 
to maximise their leverage in pursuit of their shared objective of regional stability 
(personal communications, EU officials, Addis Ababa, 2009).
Perhaps the most striking example of ‘coincident cooperation’ is Anglo-
French backing for the APSA, where the two countries provide support in quite 
different ways and using different instruments. After the Lisbon summit France 
and the UK took the lead in transforming the French RECAMP programme 
into an EU programme, EURORECAMP. Based in Paris, as France is the EU 
8 The MIVAC (Mécanisme interactif de veille et d’anticipation conjoint) initiative 
forms part of the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership. Under it the UK and France sent two 
AU colleagues to the French Foreign Affairs Ministry’s early warning centre and to the 
BBC monitoring service, Chatham House and the Royal United Services Institute (personal 
communications, British and French officials, Addis Ababa 2009).
022_Chafer_CH10.indd   166 4/11/2011   10:41:12 AM
Pr
oo
f C
op
y 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Anglo-French Cooperation vis-à-vis the African Union 167
‘framework nation’, it has a French general as its director and a British officer as 
its deputy director. The EURORECAMP programme aims to strengthen African 
peacekeeping capacity through education and training, and is ‘guided by the 
principle of African ownership’, to enable the AU to contribute more effectively 
to regional security (Africa-EU Strategic Partnership 2007: 5). A good example of 
this is its first training cycle, Amani Africa (‘Amani’ means ‘peace’ in Swahili), 
which was launched in November 2008 at the AU-EU Ministerial Troika in Addis 
Ababa. The focus of the cycle (2008–10) is to assist the AU in its decision-making 
for crisis management at continental level and in its validation of the ASF. France 
takes the lead role in agenda-setting and implementation, while the UK is the 
largest financial contributor (Elowson 2009: 62–3). Anglo-French strategic-level 
planning for Amani Africa mainly takes place at HQ level in Paris, while the EU 
Special Representative’s Office (EUSR) in Addis Ababa has sought to coordinate 
EU and member states’ support for Amani Africa, notably within the African 
Union Partners Group (AUPG), which was chaired by the UK in 2008 and by the 
EUSR in 2009.9
There have nonetheless been clear limits to this cooperation. Whilst these 
initiatives have helped ensure a degree of deconflictualisation between member 
states on the ground, the UK and France do not collaborate actively in Addis 
Ababa, either by working on joint projects or by working together within the 
AUPG, despite the fact that other member states acknowledge that they are the key 
players in the area of peace and security cooperation with the AU, and that without 
them little can be achieved (personal communications, Danish and EU officials, 
Addis Ababa, 2009). In practice both countries continue to provide a significant 
proportion of their support for the operationalisation of APSA on a bilateral 
basis (Bagayoko 2007: 2; Vines 2010: 1106). The UK channels its contributions 
(additional to those that it provides as a contributor to the European Development 
Fund) to supporting the APF on a bilateral basis through its Conflict Prevention 
Pool. It is one of the largest bilateral donors to APSA, and focuses on training 
African officers and providing funding for training exercises and peacekeeping 
operations. France, on the other hand, is one of the smallest financial contributors, 
but plays a much more prominent role than the UK in providing direct support for 
peacekeeping training exercises, thanks to its pre-positioned forces totalling some 
9,000 personnel on the continent. It usually undertakes these initiatives on its own, 
rather than jointly with other partners.
A further example of coincident cooperation is UK and French support for the 
AU mission in Somalia (AMISOM), where the two countries have separate and 
distinct approaches to supporting the AU force on the ground, largely because 
the instruments at their disposal are quite different. While both countries want 
9 The AUPG also includes China, India, the US, Canada, Russia, Norway and 
Turkey. With the creation in Addis Ababa in 2007 of the EU Special Representative’s office, 
representing the European Council and the Commission, the EU became potentially a key 
forum for Anglo-French policy coordination vis-à-vis the AU.
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to avoid direct military involvement, supported the Djibouti peace accords and 
coordinate their positions on Somalia in Brussels, notably in relation to the ESDP 
anti-piracy operation EUNAVFOR off the Somali coast, at the bilateral level the 
British have provided significant financial support to AMISOM, while the French 
launched a purely French initiative to train Somali troops in Djibouti. The UK 
put £10m into the UN-administered AMISOM Trust Fund in March 2009, and 
provided just under £1m in niche support to AMISOM in 2009–10. From May 
2008 to March 2009, the UK also gave $16.7m to the AU for AMISOM to cover 
personnel costs (troop allowances, pre-deployment training and death and injury 
benefits).10 The Somali troop training programme, on the other hand, was a purely 
French initiative, although France did subsequently try, unsuccessfully, to turn 
this into an EU programme and obtain EU funding for it at a joint meeting of the 
EU’s and AU’s PSCs in Addis Ababa in 2009 (personal communications, French 
and Danish officials, Addis Ababa, 2009; see also Le Monde, 14 October 2009). 
These differences in approach reflect the fact that the UK government, through the 
Department for International Development (DfID) budget, has money available 
for bilateral support but no troops on the ground, whereas France has almost no 
money for bilateral initiatives but has a major garrison and training facilities in 
Djibouti.11
‘Disinterested’ Cooperation
‘Disinterested cooperation’ is distinct in nature from the first two forms of 
cooperation, in that the France and the UK do not in this case necessarily have 
a specific shared agenda or seek a specific outcome from cooperation. Rather, 
as Western liberal democracies that are permanent members of the UNSC and 
major players in the EU, they frequently engage with international issues from 
which they do not expect to derive a direct benefit or reward. This can happen 
in two ways. There can be a high-level decision at national government level to 
support the other country’s position, even though this will bring the first country 
no immediate or obvious benefit, or it can happen as a result of personal initiatives 
by officials at local level. However, while the rhetoric may suggest that these 
helpful gestures are purely the result of shared Western values, there have been 
instances where realpolitik-type deals, from which both countries stand to benefit, 
have also been struck. One example of this was in 2008, when France, which at 
the time held the EU presidency, agreed to support the UK’s stance on Zimbabwe 
at EU level and then lobbied the AU for support, while the UK supported France 
10 Payment for these lines has now been taken on by the EU’s APF. 
11 This difference in approach is also noticeable in relation to the two countries’ 
support for the AU’s mission in Sudan, AMIS/UNAMID. The UK has given $62m to the 
mission, while total French bilateral aid to the AU since 2005 has been only €20m (personal 
communication, UK official, Addis Ababa, 2009, http://www.ambafrance-et.org/France_
Ethiopie/spip.php?article318, accessed 17 June 2010.
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on EUFOR Chad/CAR (personal communications, French and British officials, 
Paris, London and Addis Ababa, 2008–09). This made sense for both countries, 
as if the UK had lobbied the AU on Zimbabwe or France on Chad, their African 
interlocutors would likely have turned a deaf ear. 
Deconflictualisation
The importance of deconflictualisation as a prerequisite for any form of 
cooperation cannot be over-emphasised. During the 1990s, before the creation of 
the AU, there were profound differences between the UK and France on Charles 
Taylor’s Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire and Rwanda/DRC. As late as 2001, the UK saw 
France as undermining its position on Zimbabwe by inviting President Mugabe 
to Paris at a time when the UK was attempting to garner EU support for sanctions 
against his regime (see Chapter 4 for details). It was against this background that 
Saint-Malo was so significant, as France and the UK recognised that they had 
little to gain from adopting such conflictual positions and agreed that they would 
in future avoid such public disagreement on African issues.
These efforts to deconflictualise have extended to UK and French policy 
towards the AU. As we shall see below, this has been clear in the support that 
the two countries have provided to the AU’s condemnation of unconstitutional 
changes of government on the continent. Deconflictualisation has also underpinned 
their approaches to supporting AMIS in Darfur (which was replaced by a UN/AU 
hybrid force, UNAMID, on 31 December 2007) and AMISOM in Somalia.
Non-cooperation
The creation of the AU provided a new arena for the UK and France to work 
together and, given their shared interest in cooperating, it may seem surprising that 
cooperation has not been taken further. Indeed, although considerable progress has 
been made, cooperation, and even deconflictualisation, is not systematic. At times 
the UK and France have failed to agree or had difficulty coordinating their stances. 
These cases are revelatory of their different approaches to the AU and a useful 
indicator of the constraints that have prevented more systematic cooperation.
Perhaps the most striking recent example of non-cooperation relating to the 
AU was the contrasting UK and French responses to the Prodi report (Prodi 
2008). Romano Prodi was commissioned by the UNSC in 2008 to draw up a 
report on how the UN could improve its support for peacekeeping in Africa, 
with a view to providing more predictable, flexible and sustainable funding 
for AU peacekeeping operations. With the growing demand for peacekeeping 
operations on the continent, funding was a growing issue as, once an operation 
was authorised, contributions then had to be sought from member states whose 
contributions were entirely voluntary. The report’s key recommendation was the 
creation of a dual system of financial support for the AU’s peacekeeping efforts, 
involving voluntary contributions by member states to support AU capacity-
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building efforts, and obligatory contributions to establish a UN fund that would 
be available to support UN-authorised peacekeeping operations undertaken by the 
AU. The UK supported the report’s key recommendation, whereas France, along 
with the US and Russia, opposed mandatory financing and supported instead a 
voluntary system of multi-donor transfers. This difference was consistent with 
the UK’s greater enthusiasm for working with the UN and France’s preference 
for working through the EU in support of African peacekeeping efforts (Matlary 
2009: 101–2, Vines 2010: 1106–7). In the end, the UK brokered a compromise 
in the Africa Working Group in Brussels, whereby EU member states agreed 
to ‘keep all options under consideration’ (personal communication, EU official, 
Addis Ababa, 2009), and this was the position eventually adopted by the UNSC 
on 26 October 2009. However, the question of funding for AU peacekeeping 
operations remains unresolved, with the UK preferring a reliable UN mechanism 
and France preferring to focus on developing the EU’s support capacity (personal 
communications, French officials, Brussels and Addis Ababa, 2009).
Moreover, while the UK and France have usually been able to deconflictualise, 
their positions vis-à-vis the AU, this has not always been straightforward. For 
example, following the 2008 coup in Madagascar, the British Minister for Africa, 
Lord Malloch-Brown, publicly condemned the coup, whereas France took a 
more conciliatory line even than the AU itself (personal communications, AU 
official, Addis Ababa, 2009; former minister, London, 2009). Although the two 
governments did eventually align their stances, their different public positions in 
the immediate aftermath of the coup were symptomatic of deeper differences in 
reaction to unconstitutional changes of government in Africa. One reason for this 
is that the French stance on such changes is not always clear. This can lead to a 
gap between the public discourse of support for human rights and condemnation 
of unconstitutional changes of government on the one hand, and the actions of 
individuals close to the government on the other, that suggest a more qualified 
position. This happened, for example, in the case of the coup d’état that followed 
the death of Guinean president Lansana Conté in 2008 (Survie 2009). It can also 
be the result of differences between government representatives, as happened 
in the case of the 2009 coup in Mauritania when President Sarkozy appeared to 
contradict France’s official position of condemnation of the coup (Libération, 
8 April, 17 July 2009). The consequence is that British diplomats sometimes 
wonder who is articulating the French government’s real position on such issues. 
This uncertainty undermines trust and affects the ability of the two countries to 
cooperate effectively vis-à-vis the AU. 
Constraints on Cooperation
The UK and French foreign policy-making establishments have divergent 
perceptions of Africa in general, and of the AU in particular, in the context of 
their countries’ broader foreign policy priorities and interests, and in designing 
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policy they are constrained by other factors, notably institutional constraints and 
the views of the wider domestic polity, on state preferences. These three factors 
are considered in turn.
Divergent Interests
Despite the common ground between them identified above, Paris and London 
attach different relative importance to African multilateral organisations at the 
continental and sub-regional levels. For France, Africa plays a crucial role in 
enhancing its rank in the international pecking order, with the result that political, 
diplomatic and military considerations are to the forefront in shaping policy. 
There is a strong element of defending Francophonie, particularly in west and 
central Africa, and thus a perception that French influence and power can best 
be projected by working with African sub-regional organisations, notably the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Economic 
Community of Central African States (personal communications, British official, 
Addis Ababa, 2009; French official, Dakar, 2010), and by working closely with 
key allies in these regions where France has interests or good relations with the 
government, such as Burkina Faso and Gabon. Moreover, France is sceptical 
about the AU’s capacity to speak on behalf of the whole continent, and believes 
that international expectations of it are too ambitious, considering that it is an 
organisation that is still in its infancy (personal communications, French officials, 
Addis Ababa, 2009).
For UK policy-makers, on the other hand, Africa is primarily a development 
issue and policy has a continent-wide purview. This is reflected in the rise to 
prominence of DfID, which has played a major role in shaping UK policy on 
Africa since 1997. DfID was a product of New Labour’s internationalism, with 
its strong focus on the poorest and most disadvantaged people on the planet. 
This ethical dimension to African policy was supported at the highest levels of 
government: Tony Blair’s Christian approach (he once described Africa as a ‘scar 
on the conscience of the world’) and Gordon Brown’s ‘moral compass’ were key 
drivers behind the UK approach to the continent (Gallagher 2009: 449–51). New 
Labour’s internationalism was also manifest in the priority it attached to working 
with international organisations such as the G7/G8/G20, the UN and the AU.
Not only do France and the UK attach different priority to Africa, they also 
adopt a different approach, with France’s focus essentially ‘sub-regional’ and the 
UK’s continent-wide. France has historically had a strong interest in west and 
central Africa and has invested significantly in ECOWAS in recent years. The 
French government therefore favours engagement with Africa’s sub-regional 
organisations. Although much has been made of French military retrenchment in 
Africa, what has happened is, rather, a reconfiguration of French pre-positioned 
forces so as to maintain a presence in the four regions of sub-Saharan Africa that 
correspond to the four brigades of the ASF: Dakar (West Africa: 1,200 troops), 
Libreville (Central Africa: 800 troops), Djibouti (East Africa: 2,700 troops), and 
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La Réunion (Southern Africa: 4,200 troops).12 The mission of these forces is to 
cooperate with, and provide peacekeeping support for, the regional brigades of 
the ASF. In this role they sometimes coordinate with the British, as we have seen, 
but this is not their sole purpose. They are also there to defend French national 
interests and support French citizens in each of the major regions of Africa. These 
twin missions reinforce the ‘sub-regional’ rather than continent-wide nature of 
French engagement with Africa, which helps to explain why French engagement 
with Africa has tended to concentrate on working with the regional brigades of the 
ASF, such as the ECOWAS standby force. In contrast, the UK has invested less 
heavily in ECOWAS, has a continent-wide perspective and interests, and is more 
enthusiastic about the AU.
Institutional Constraints
While both countries have stated their wish to move beyond their traditional 
spheres of influence on the continent, the fact remains that the UK has a depth 
of knowledge about Anglophone Africa and France a wealth of expertise about 
Francophone Africa that means that in practice they generally focus their 
engagement with the AU on the countries they know best. The result is often 
a de facto ‘division of labour’, in which France continues to take the political 
lead on certain countries and the UK on others. The creation of the AU has not 
overturned this fundamental dynamic, which makes active cooperation on joint 
projects difficult to achieve as their efforts are simply focused either in different 
policy areas or on different countries (personal communication, DfID official, 
London, 2010).
These differences in approach are also reflected in the work of the UK and 
French ambassadors in Addis Ababa. Both are ‘double-hatted’, in the sense that 
they are accredited to Ethiopia as well as the AU, and both also deal with regional 
issues, as neither the UK nor France has embassies in all the countries of the 
region. France has significant interests in Djibouti and good links with the Eritrean 
government, so that a key focus of the work of the French ambassador is regional 
issues in the Horn of Africa, insofar as they affect French interests in these 
countries. The French embassy in Addis Ababa has also been heavily involved 
in crisis management because of the many recent crises in its ‘pré carré’. This 
priority attached to engaging with regional political and military issues inevitably 
means that it has less time for engagement with the AU (personal communications, 
French, British and Danish officials, Addis Ababa, 2009). In contrast, the UK 
ambassador, for whom long-term capacity-building in cooperation with the AU 
12 La Réunion is an overseas department of France and troops stationed there are 
therefore charged with defending French sovereign territory as well as providing support 
to the ASF. In addition, French forces numbering some 2,450 were deployed on specific 
operations in Chad, Côte d’Ivoire and CAR at the end of 2009. The Dakar base is currently 
scheduled to close (Jeune Afrique 2010: 27 February).
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is a priority, can devote more time to this. The UK embassy in Addis had by 2009 
increased to five the number of staff working on the AU, whereas the French 
embassy only had two such staff.
A more fundamental institutional constraint is that France has no equivalent 
to the UK’s DfID. Not only this, but with the former Development directorate 
in the Foreign Affairs Ministry subsumed since 2009 within the much larger 
Globalisation directorate, French engagement with the AU is inevitably mainly 
political, diplomatic and military. This sidelining of development issues is reflected 
in the staff present in the embassy in Addis Ababa, whose focus is political and 
military issues and not long-term capacity-building and development work. In 
contrast, alongside its defence attaché and diplomatic personnel, the UK has a 
significant DfID presence within its embassy. As a result, the development agenda 
is to the forefront in British engagement with the AU. Moreover, with no obvious 
counterparts in the French embassy with whom they can cooperate on development 
issues, DfID staff inevitably look to other partners, notably the ‘Nordic +’ group, 
with which to work on such issues.
Civil Society and Resource Constraints
Parliamentary and civil society constraints also play a role in shaping UK and 
French policy towards the AU. The British government faces a powerful and 
vocal NGO lobby on development and humanitarian issues in Africa, which 
Labour governments in particular simply cannot afford, politically, to ignore. The 
French government, in contrast, while it has a prominent lobby for humanitarian 
intervention, led notably by Médecins sans Frontières and Médecins du Monde, 
does not face any significant NGO lobby in the development field (Cumming 2009). 
Just as importantly, reductions in public expenditure, exacerbated by the 
2008–09 global financial crisis, have limited the scope of cooperation. In the case 
of the UK, this prompted a review of priorities in Africa that led, for example, 
to cuts in the Conflict Prevention Pool budget and the downgrading of the 
strategic priority attached to west and central Africa (personal communications, 
British officials, London, 2009). These ongoing cutbacks, together with the fact 
that France has troops on the ground in Africa and has cultivated good links 
with ECOWAS with the result that it is less dependent on the AU than the UK, 
accentuate the trend towards the sub-regional (French) versus continent-wide 
(UK) approach. Moreover, the French government’s capacity to maintain troops 
on the ground in Africa is facilitated by the fact that such deployments are not 
subject to parliamentary approval in the way that they are in the UK.
Conclusion
In sum, no formal partnership has been established between the UK and France to 
work together with the AU. While the two countries now enjoy more constructive 
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ties with regard to Africa than in the past, joint Anglo-French working vis-à-vis 
the AU remains limited in scope. To be sure, they have sought to deconflictualise 
their approaches to Africa, and recognised that they benefit from working together 
with the AU on certain issues, as this enhances their influence in a context in which 
their traditional spheres of influence are increasingly under challenge from new 
external actors. It also plays well in the international arena for them to be seen to 
be working together to support the AU in managing and resolving crises. At the 
same time, both countries want to avoid direct military involvement, so it makes 
sense for them to train and support Africans to take greater responsibility for 
guaranteeing peace and security on the continent. In these respects the emergence 
of the AU as a credible interlocutor has opened up new opportunities for Anglo-
French cooperation. Yet, at capital level and on the ground in Addis Ababa, there is 
no systematic effort at joint working. Rather, Anglo-French cooperation vis-à-vis 
the AU is often ad hoc, driven by personalities on the ground who see the benefits 
of cooperation and who happen to get on well, or the product of coinciding agendas 
that are not directly related to African policy per se.
The uneven nature of cooperation is also the product of the two countries’ 
different forms and level of engagement with the AU. Although both the UK 
and France stand to benefit from enhanced cooperation, the neoclassical realist 
framework of analysis adopted here has helped to explain how divergent foreign 
policy priorities, institutional and resource constraints have placed limits on the 
extent of cooperation. Moreover, there is a dialectical relationship between decision-
makers’ perceptions and the policy choices that flow from them, on the one hand, 
and the institutional structures that deliver African policy on the other. The former 
shape the latter and the latter in turn feed back into and reinforce the perceptions 
and priorities of policy-makers. Both have played a role in shaping the contrasting 
French and British approaches to the AU. Thus, New Labour’s commitment to a 
new form of internationalism that sought to be morally superior and go beyond the 
pursuit of naked self-interest in foreign policy shaped the UK government’s more 
value-driven approach to the world’s poorest continent between 1997 and 2010. 
Against this background development and poverty reduction, alongside peace and 
security, have been the key drivers of policy towards the AU, with DfID playing 
a lead role in setting the agenda for policy, whereas on the French side, political, 
diplomatic and military concerns are the key policy motors. This is reflected in 
the deployment of resources, both material and human, to support the AU: the 
UK is, through DfID, a significant development aid donor and takes the lead on 
the MDGs in the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership, whereas France takes the lead 
on military and security cooperation through the EURORECAMP programme. 
Cooperation is thus most advanced in the area in which the UK and France have a 
shared agenda – peace and security – but very limited in other fields.
Furthermore, the whole ‘Saint-Malo 2’ process relating to cooperation in 
Africa and with the AU was in large part the product of factors that had nothing 
intrinsically to do with Africa or the AU, such as the coincidence of wider foreign 
policy objectives in relation to European policy. Personalities also played a key 
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role with, for example, foreign ministers Cook and Védrine, who personally got 
on well, playing a key role at the outset and Sarkozy and Brown subsequently 
renewing the two countries’ commitment to cooperate on Africa at the 2008 
Franco-British summit. This raises the question: how compatible is the bilateral 
UK-French approach to cooperation with the AU with the ‘bi-multi’ approach to 
Africa in multilateral fora such as the EU and UNSC? The analysis presented 
here suggests that these processes of cooperation are compatible, at least on 
the security front, despite differences of emphasis between the UK and France. 
Crucially though, long-term sustainability also depends on continuing AU support 
for the process. Thus, if security continues to be the virtually exclusive focus 
for cooperation with the AU and this comes to be seen as driven, ultimately, by 
European security interests, this will undermine AU member states’ support for 
the process and could lead to the AU withdrawing its support for the Africa-EU 
Strategic Partnership. 
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